Postiz Security Advisories

Channel tokens and organization API key exposed in API responses

Two authenticated Postiz endpoints returned the full database row instead of the fields the client needs. Deleting a channel through the public API returned that channel's platform access and refresh tokens to the calling OAuth app, and GET /user/organizations returned the organization API key to every member, although it is meant to be visible to admins only.

Unauthenticated /enterprise/create-user mints lifetime top-tier organizations and discloses their API key

The /enterprise/create-user endpoint is not covered by authentication middleware and accepts any token signed with the instance JWT secret. Ordinary login tokens are signed with that same secret and carry no purpose claim, so any registered user can replay their own session token to create a new organisation with a permanent top-tier subscription and receive its API key in the response. Only deployments with billing enabled are affected.

Unauthenticated recovery of the Math.random() state behind OAuth tokens, authorization codes, client secrets and organization API keys

Postiz generates OAuth access tokens, authorization codes, OAuth client secrets and per-organization API keys with a helper that draws every character from Math.random(), a non-cryptographic generator. Its output is directly observable, in bulk, from an endpoint that requires no authentication. Recovering the generator's internal state from that output is a linear-algebra problem, after which credentials minted for other organizations follow deterministically.

DMARC not enabled for postiz.com

Postiz has not enabled DMARC on their primary domain, resulting to email forgery.

Unauthenticated arbitrary file read via /uploads path traversal (URL-encoded separators) leading to instance takeover

Unauthenticated arbitrary file read via /uploads path traversal (URL-encoded separators) leading to instance takeover

Insufficient verification of lifetime-deal redemption codes allows forgery of permanent paid subscriptions

Unauthenticated arbitrary lifetime PRO grant via Nowpayments webhook

Unauthenticated billing-enforcement bypass via /public/modify-subscription

SUPERADMIN takeover via Skool-provider JWT forgery

Attackers can exploit the skool-provider JWT sign process to generate a JWT token with isSuperAdmin: true

TOCTOU DNS rebinding bypasses all SSRF URL validation paths

TOCTOU DNS rebinding bypasses all SSRF URL validation paths